How spin has hidden the true cost of Afghanistan

THE bodies were barely cold and the air still smelled of cordite when the US ambassador in Afghanistan dismissed a 20-hour battle, which killed 16 people and brought Kabul to a standstill, as “minor league” this week. “This really is not a very big deal,” Ryan Crocker quipped.

Two days earlier, General John Allen, the commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, marked the tenth anniversary of 9/11 by declaring he had “reversed the momentum” of the insurgents – even though his troops had just suffered one of the bloodiest weekends of the decade long war, with more than 80 wounded.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has claimed humanitarian access for its workers is at a 30-year low, and independent conflict monitors insist violence is up 34 per cent this year, compared to the same period in 2010. Yet Gen Allen insisted: “We are on the path to success in Afghanistan.”

These brazen statements by top US civilian and military officials in Kabul have highlighted a long-standing gap between rhetoric and reality.

“All these comments are indicative of the disconnect between international actors and the Afghans who live the conflict every day,” said Candace Rondeaux, the senior Kabul-based analyst for the International Crisis Group think-tank.

“It does nothing to reverse Afghan perceptions of the failure of US policy here, in fact it only reinforces the sense of despair and even hostility that some Afghans may feel towards the international mission.”

Research by The Scotsman has unveiled similar examples of Orwellian doublespeak, military hubris and over-optimistic analyses dating back to the start of the war. Almost every year since 2001 has been described as “critical” or a turning point. The Taleban have been beaten, scattered, spent and – according to official statements – they are constantly under pressure.

“The US keeps sending postcards back to Washington DC saying, ‘all on track, Taleban on the run, security much improved,’ but to do that they have to turn a blind eye to a shaky government, flawed and abusive Afghan security forces, and consistent demonstrations of strength by the Taleban,” said Rachel Reid, Afghanistan and Pakistan policy adviser for the Open Society Foundation. “This is all about news management, and little about the rocky ground truths.”

In 2004 Lt General David Barno promised the insurgents’ day had ended. “This year will decisively sound the death knell of their movements,” he said. General David Richards, a former commander of the Nato’s International Security Assistance Force, now Chief of the Defence Staff, said the Taleban were a “spent force” in 2006.

In 2008, Brigadier Mark Carlton-Smith said the insurgents had been “clobbered,” and in 2010 Nato’s Senior Civilian Representative, Mark Sedwill, said Kabul was safer than Glasgow or New York.

Yet the United Nations’ security maps – which measure which parts of the country are safe to visit – have grown redder and redder over the course of the war, as swathes of territory are declared off-limits.

The Afghan NGO Safety Office (Anso), an independent humanitarian agency which collates data on insurgent trends and attacks, reports a constant year-on-year rise in violence. Anso figures show there were roughly 10,000 security incidents between January and August, compared with roughly 5,000 during the same period 2009 and 8,000 last year.

“If it is getting better then why is it that aid workers cannot move around as freely as they used to,” said Nic Lee, Anso’s director. “The difference between what the military says and how civilians are able to act is a chasm. The rhetoric doesn’t reflect reality at all and I think they know it.”

At least six rocket propelled grenades exploded inside the US embassy during this week’s attack, which lasted from 1pm on Tuesday until 9am Wednesday. An Afghan security guard and three Afghan civilians, including a girl queuing for a visa, were injured and airlifted to hospital.

Soldiers in Nato’s headquarters barricaded themselves inside a dining room with chairs, amid fears their perimeter had been overrun. Three of the busiest roads in the capital were sealed off, shops were forced to close and residents in a nearby apartment blocks were ordered to evacuate.

Yet Ambassador Crocker insisted it was nothing. “Half a dozen RPG rounds from 800 metres away that isn’t Tet [a major offensive in the Vietnam War], that’s harassment,” he said. “If that’s the best they can do, you know, I think it’s actually a statement of their weakness.”

Nader Naderi, spokesman for Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission, said US officials had failed to see beyond the assault’s military effects. “The psychological impact on society, in terms of the fear it creates, is much bigger than the actual military achievements,” he said. “It has created a higher degree of fear in Kabul and uncertainty in the population.

“It makes people sceptical about the future.”