United we stand on bulk of policies

THE Scots are, of course, more left-leaning than the English. Or at least that's what we generally assume. That assumption is deeply bound up with the devolution story. It is one of devolution's founding images: devolution was about allowing a social democratic consensus in Scotland to break free from the free market behemoth that is England. Well, it wasn't. Not really.

In fact the differences between the Scottish and the English on social democracy versus free markets are generally pretty small. Public attitudes surveys sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) over the last few years show that the Scots see themselves as more left-wing than the English see themselves, but only marginally.

On a scale of 1-5 (with 1 the most left-wing and 5 the most right-wing) the English marked themselves right in the middle at 2.5, the Scots a fraction to the left, at 2.4.

When it comes to issues such as taxation and inequality, the story is much the same. About the same proportion of English and Scottish citizens - 60 per cent or so - agree that we should be taxed more if the proceeds are spent on health, education and social benefits. The English and the Scots also agree that ordinary working people do not get a fair share of the nation's wealth. In fact, the Welsh and Northern Irish think much the same.

In the two most prominent areas where the Scottish Parliament has introduced real changes from policy in England - abolition of up-front tuition fees for university students and free long-term care for the elderly - there is close to zero difference in Scottish and English opinion.

Overwhelming majorities (85-90 per cent) in both nations think the state should pay for long-term care. And only three in ten Scots and English think that students should be exempt from paying fees while studying. To put it a different way, English policy is out of step with a uniform Anglo-Scottish public opinion on long-term care, and Scottish policy is out of step with a uniform Anglo-Scottish public opinion on tuition fees.

In only two areas does there seem to be any notable difference between Scottish and English views. Scots are consistently more likely to favour comprehensive secondary education than the English (around two-thirds of Scots and about half of the English oppose selection). By a smaller margin, Scots are more likely to think that unemployment benefits are too low.

Those differences aside, there is gap scarcely the thickness of a cigarette paper's difference between Scottish and English views on matters which usually distinguish left and right. As the Strathclyde academic John Curtice puts it, if Scotland is a predominantly social democratic country, then so is England.

One other way of looking at these issues is to ask whether the Scots and the English think policies should be allowed to vary from place to place within the UK.

Higher levels of acceptance of policy variation might suggest that the Scots feel they have a distinctive set of policy concerns. Well, they do, just about, but again not by much. Around 40 per cent of Scots think that policies like health, school, roads and policing should be allowed to vary in different parts of the UK - as opposed to a third of the English. But then again that means that the majority in both places think policies should be the same across the UK.

If we are all social democrats in Scotland and England, and if most of us want uniform, UK-wide policies, then it poses the question of what - if not to do things differently - devolution is actually for.

At a recent ESRC seminar at Edinburgh University, a grizzled US academic hit the nail on the head. He was perplexed at not hearing about devolution in relation to concrete policy aims - in other words, as a means to an end - but instead in relation to process - as he put it, "lots of warm, fuzzy feelings", about participation, consultation and inclusion. This chimes with one of the other founding images of devolution: that of devolution as necessary for re-connecting Scots with a political process that was felt, in the Thatcher-Major years, to have become closed to Scottish concerns. In this respect, public attitudes fit the founding imagery.

One of the striking features of public opinion on devolution in Scotland is the way people combine indifference about the impact of devolution in practice with strong support for devolution in principle. Has devolution given ordinary people more say in how they are governed? Has it increased standards of education? Most Scots say it has made no difference.

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of devolution, and if we ask people about how they should be governed we get a different picture. Most people think the Scottish Parliament - and definitely not Westminster - should have most say in how Scotland is run. Devolution is the majority constitutional choice in Scotland, more popular than independence and direct rule by Westminster put together. A steady 60 per cent-plus of Scots think the Scottish Parliament should have even more powers than it has now. Incidentally, the English are just as supportive of devolution in Scotland as the Scots are, even though they don't support devolution in England. That is a ringing endorsement of devolution.

So devolution is not about doing things differently to the English; it is not about expressing policy preferences different to those held by the English. But people in Scotland still want more of it. That suggests that devolution is more about getting ownership of the political process than pursuing any great difference of policy objectives. Or, if people think devolution has made no difference, at least it is "their" institutions that have done so.

Professor Charlie Jeffery directs the ESRC's research programme at Edinburgh University. He is running a seminar at the University on 20 June comparing territorial policy variation in the UK and Germany. The research used here was carried out for ESRC by the British Social Attitudes Survey and the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey.