Playing dirty in nuclear stakes

On 24 April, 1984, the respected Jane's Defence Weekly reported that Iran was in the final stages of producing a nuclear bomb that could be ready in two years. Sound familiar?

In the past quarter century, forecasts of when Iran might have a nuclear bomb have been issued, and proven wrong, so frequently that nuclear experts have coined the phrase "rolling estimate".

Iranian bomb estimates have been making headlines again this month after Meir Dagan, on the day he handed over leadership of the Israeli secret service Mossad to his successor, said he did not believe Iran could have a nuclear capability before 2015.

It was not diplomacy but a campaign of sabotage and murder that gave Mr Dagan reason to believe Iran was farther from the bomb than previously estimated.

By many accounts, the principal reason the Iranian nuclear programme slowed down is a sophisticated computer worm, Stuxnet, which took out almost 1,000 of the centrifuges at the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility. The New York Times reported this week that it was a joint US-Israeli effort. Neither the US nor Israel denied the story.

There has been official silence on the attacks in Tehran last November on two Iranian nuclear scientists. The attacks were carried out by motorcycle-riding assassins who magnetically attached bombs to the cars of their targets. One scientist was killed in the blasts.

The attacks highlighted the view of many that the end justifies the means when it comes to stopping Iran from pursuing the bomb.