John McTernan: Discretion is the better part of valour

For that is what we are becoming accustomed to from Sir Richard Dannatt, formerly Chief of the General Staff (CGS) - head of the Army - who hit the airwaves again last weekend, this time to promote his book.

There are three questions raised by Sir Richard's account of his time in the Ministry of Defence. The first, which most coverage has focussed on, is how well did the last Labour government look after the Armed Forces.

Lord George Robertson, Tony Blair's first defence secretary, is widely acknowledged as having started well with a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Looking back over a decade at it, this was a far-sighted review of the strategic challenges facing the UK - and has stood the test of time.

At the last General Election all the main parties promised a fresh SDR if elected - one is now being conducted by Liam Fox. However, that is less to do with transformation of the strategic context and the threats we face than a deterioration in public finances and the costs we can bear. So this is, in effect, an SSR (Strategic Spending Review) not an SDR. It's not the strategy Dannatt contests but the implementation. Ultimately, he alleges, the armed forces were under-resourced for what they have been called on to deliver.

There's a technical answer to this - Treasury fully funds operations at the front-line through a process called Urgent Operational Requirements. And there's a practical one which is that you can find a string of quotes from officers on the front-line saying that they and their men have never been as well equipped as they are now. But this is a political point, aimed at two men - Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The case against Blair is that he committed forces too ill-equipped to deploy, and therefore exposed them to mortal danger, a charge that Sir Richard was careful to distance himself from yesterday morning on the Today programme.

The case against Brown is that he deliberately refused to fund the forces adequately. Now it is true that Tony Blair got on famously with the Chiefs of Staff - and would have been happier with higher levels of defence spending. And it is true Gordon Brown found the Chiefs less clubbable - but he also had to balance the books. More money for defence meant less for health or education.He struck a balance, but was it wrong? Defence did get more money from Brown - just not as much more as it always wanted.

This is the second question Dannatt's interventions raise - the question of leadership. Being a leader is about making choices. Even in the best of all possible worlds, trade-offs are necessary yet you get the impression from Dannatt's public pronouncements that he believes in a world without any, at least for the Army. He shows a frustration with the commitments made on the two new aircraft carriers for the Navy and the purchase of new jets for the RAF. The rising stars in the armed forces look at the top of the office and see legacy projects being procured which will consume resources for decades to come, when the current Chiefs have gone. Those who will run the forces in future despair at the thought of the consequences of these decisions.

Dannatt himself now talks about a "relevant force" rather than a "balanced force". But in office, what did he do - seek a balanced procurement programme? Not exactly, he fought for his own major capital project - the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), a next generation of army vehicles. Fair enough, one might say, but a man as bright as Sir Richard should recognise his own behaviour was gaming the system as much as anyone else.

The third, and perhaps most disturbing question is raised by the indecent speed with which Dannatt sought to become a political player as soon as he left his post. More than a few eyebrows were raised in the services when he popped up as an adviser to then Opposition Leader David Cameron.

Now, this is not to say that military personnel should be barred from pursuing political careers - indeed, their experience can, and does, enrich the House of Commons. But while serving as CGS Sir Richard maintained a high media profile through which, both directly and indirectly, he had telegraphed his unhappiness with government decisions.

At the time these could have been interpreted - if not excused - as professional discontent, speaking up for the Army. But with an apparent party affiliation revealed so quickly a different interpretation could be made. As Ed Stourton recently pointed out in a thoughtful Radio 4 piece reflecting on the state of modern American politics, the US Army has long produced leaders who regard themselves as "warrior-philosphers". One general - Eisenhower - went on to be President; others have thought about it or have tried. And as faith in political institutions in the US fades, support for the army grows.

It has been different in Britain, and while we need to know that ministers, even Prime Ministers, enjoy honest advice and, at times, blunt speaking from our generals I am not sure that we want to see future Dannatts blurring the line between government and army.

President Obama was faced with a tough choice when General Stanley McChrystal was quoted in Rolling Stone questioning his government's strategy in Afghanistan.He thought deeply and acted decisively, sacking McChrystal, a gifted and charismatic leader, and replacing him with General David Petraeus. He did this to make it absolutely clear that the US armed forces exist to serve the government of the day. The President is the Commander-in-Chief. Separation of powers runs right through the American constitution. As with many things in Britain, here it is implicit not stated.

Perhaps, to borrow a phrase from Attlee, the best advice for Sir Richard Dannaat after his book has been published is for there to be a period of silence.

John McTernan: Discretion is the better part of valour - even for generals