Hugh V McLachlan: Why voting should always be matter of choice

It might be said that, since our system of parliamentary democracy is dependent on the action of voting in elections, we have a moral duty to vote and that voting, like paying tax, should be legally compulsory.

In general, if we accept the benefits of living in a particular political jurisdiction, we ought to accept the consequent burdens. For instance, we ought to pay our taxes because taxation is necessary to support the running of the legal and other civic operations that provide the relative comfort, security and peace we normally gladly enjoy. It is justifiable to make tax evasion a crime because it is irresponsible and because it imposes additional burdens on lawful taxpayers.

If some people pay less tax, other things being equal, other people are required to pay more. However, if some people refrain from voting, the rest of the electorate are not thereby required to vote harder or more often. Failure to vote does not create the sort of imposition on others that tax evasion does.

Furthermore, it is manifest that our system of parliamentary democracy does not require that a large proportion of the electorate votes at each election in order to work. In theory, if only one vote were cast in a constituency, that would be sufficient to duly elect a member of parliament.

It is sometimes said that the system would, in some vague, unspecified ways, work better if more people were enthusiastic about it and more people voted. This might or might not be true but it is irrelevant. We are not morally obliged always to act in such a way that our political system works as well as it could do. We are not morally obliged to adopt the mental attitudes that would best suit it.

On some occasions – the impending General Election might well be one – the very best possible occurrence might be if no-one at all were to vote. If no votes were cast for any of the candidates, the effect of such a boycott might, in the long run, be highly beneficial. Even if it had no salutary effects, the point such a boycott would make might be worth making. However, it does not follow that each person is obliged to refrain from voting at, say, the impending election. We are not always morally obliged to act in such a way that the best occurrence would be brought about if everyone were so to act.

Similarly, that good effects would ensue were we all to vote at each election would not morally oblige us each to do so.

People do not always have a preference between the particular candidates for whom they could vote. They could hardly have a moral obligation to act as if they did have such a preference and they should not be legally required so to act.

If we do have a preference, it is far from clear that we have a moral obligation to act upon it. For instance, we might prefer one candidate because we do not like the accents of the others or prefer one candidate to the others because, say, of her sex, age or colour. We are legally entitled to vote on the basis of any factor, however whimsical or distasteful others might consider it to be. However, if we lack a defensible reason for indicating a preference by our vote, it is far from obvious that we are morally obliged to vote in such circumstances. There might even be a case for saying that, in such circumstances, we ought not to vote for any of the candidates.

However, our current parliamentary election system is such that it is not possible to vote without seeming to indicate a preference, a preference which we might not actually have or for which we might not have a morally relevant reason.

Furthermore, to the invitation to select from a list of candidates, there are significant possible responses we might want to make that cannot be indicated by the current system. Unless such responses could be expressed, the claim that we have a moral duty to vote falls at the first hurdle.

For instance, when faced with a list of candidates, we might want to say, "any of the above" or "any of the above except so-and so". We might want to say, "none of the above" or "none of the above except, at a pinch and with much reluctance, so-and-so".

If some people in the past sacrificed their lives so that we could have the right to vote, does this not morally oblige us now to use our vote?

No, it does not.

In the past, some people sacrificed their lives so that we might worship God or worship Him in particular ways. Atheists are unlikely to regard this as a reason for going to church far less as a reason to thinking that they are morally obliged to do go. There might be good reasons for going to Church nowadays and for voting but the actions of past martyrs is hardly one of them.

Furthermore, the right to refrain from going to Church is an important right. So too is the right to refrain from voting.

We often choose to make legal distinctions that do not reflect moral differences. Our reasons for doing so need not be moral ones. For instance, there is no inherent moral difference between driving on the left or on the right of the road. There are good reasons, only some of which are moral ones, for choosing to have a legal preference for driving motor vehicles on one or other side of the road.

Hence, we could choose to make it a legal obligation to vote whether or not we are otherwise morally obliged to vote.

However, we need to have good reasons for making particular actions crimes and none is apparent for making it legally compulsory to vote in parliamentary elections.

In some circumstances and in some elections, we might have a moral obligation to vote and even to vote for a particular candidate. However, such circumstances and such elections are not ubiquitous. It is far from clear that we are all always morally obliged to cast our votes in parliamentary elections. We should never be legally obliged to do so.

Hugh V McLachlan is professor of applied philosophy at the school of law and social sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University