Gerard DeGroot: What cost Britain's illusion of grandeur?

In all likelihood, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) scheduled for release later this month will, like its predecessors, be remarkable only for its profound disconnection with reality. A government incapable of defining Britain's role is unlikely to devise a logical security strategy.

In truth, Acheson was not being entirely fair. Britain has, since the war, had a role, but its role has been neither realistic nor appropriate. Sacred imperial assumptions have clouded strategy. Uncomfortable with mediocrity, Britain has, at great cost, maintained an illusion of greatness. Her pretence of world power status has fooled no one but herself.

Central to this rather pathetic desire for greatness was the need to possess nuclear weapons. In 1946, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told the Cabinet: 'We've got to have (the atom bomb] … whatever it costs. We've got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it.' For the same reason, Winston Churchill, in 1953, decided that Britain needed the hydrogen bomb. 'We must do it', he stressed. 'It is the price we pay to sit at the top table.' As is clear, both Bevin and Churchill were thinking about status not security. The Bomb was symbol, not a weapon.

Therein lies the problem that has plagued every defence review. Obsessed with status, Britain has tended to trumpet her greatness by rather old-fashioned means, namely big-ticket military hardware. That hardware has in turn been attractive not for the security it brings, but for the strength it implies. This has meant that billions have been spent on hugely expensive weapons of little real utility, while at the same time British soldiers on the ground have been forced to go without the basic equipment needed to operate effectively.

Other successful nations, less obsessed with machismo, have demonstrated their greatness in more constructive fashion, for instance through industrial strength, financial stability, social progress or cultural vitality. Yet no one can realistically argue that those nations (Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain among them) are more vulnerable because of their failure to arm themselves to the teeth.In fact, it could be argued that Britain's desire to strut on the big stage, with pistols cocked, has made her more vulnerable than she ought to be.

In his recent book, Washington Rules, Andrew Bacevich, a former colonel in the US Army, has exposed the way strategic decisions made out of habit rather than from reason have given rise to a situation where the US is today stronger than it has ever been, but also more vulnerable. The "rules" he exposes in his book, accepted by every administration from Truman to Obama, dictate that protection of the American way of life necessitates a global military presence and a willingness to intervene anywhere. Lately, these rules have pushed the US to a state of perpetual war.

Bacevich confines his analysis to the United States, but the paradigm he exposes is equally relevant to the UK, America's trusty lieutenant. For "Washington rules", read instead "Whitehall rules". These rules hold that Britain must be near the top of the table in per capita expenditure on arms. She must faithfully support American strategy. She must export democracy. She must have atomic weapons. She must have aircraft carriers. She must have a large bomber force, modern tanks and nuclear submarines. The rules, like the thick armour that protects a British frigate, are absolutely impervious to penetrating criticism. The simple question 'Why?' is never asked.

Ideally, the SDSR should question these rules, but it is more likely that sacred cows will block the way of enlightened enquiry. Of late, the debate has been dominated by whether Britain can afford the kind of equipment always assumed essential, namely Trident (supported by David Cameron in his party conference speech yesterday), aircraft carriers, fighter-bombers and tanks. Missing from the discussion is sufficient consideration of the actual threats Britain faces and whether those weapons, affordable or not, actually make Britain more secure.

A realistic and fruitful SDSR would first decide what Britain's strategy should actually be. For too long, strategy has been formulated in Washington. But aping American strategy has not made Britain more secure, rather the opposite.

In the very simplest terms, Britain's strategy must focus on making the British people more secure. What does that mean? It does not mean, as in the past, protecting borders from invasion. There is no credible threat to Britain's territorial integrity. Nor are we likely to come under nuclear attack from another state - the present nuclear powers are all friends. The biggest danger of nuclear attack comes from non-state actors, namely terrorists. Yet renewing Trident does not address that threat, since it is impossible to deter an enemy who has no return address. The biggest threat facing Britain is terrorism. Britain's strategy for dealing with that threat, namely signing on to the ridiculously ill-conceived war on terror, has been conspicuously unsuccessful.The threat has increased because of misguided efforts to reduce it.

A defence review grounded in realism - in other words, one genuinely designed to make Britain safer - would focus upon beating the terrorist. This would not mean purchasing equipment to fight more wars like Afghanistan, but would instead produce a coherent and coordinated programme to address the causes and consequences of terrorism. Such a review would result in procurement priorities unlike any in British history since most of the weapons needed to defeat the terrorist are not weapons at all. The bulk of expenditure would be shifted from tanks and aircraft carriers to espionage and cyber-security. There would be fewer boy toys to show off at air shows, but the British people would sleep safer at night.

Perhaps the most attractive feature of such a review would be its cost. The high-tech devices most appropriate to fighting the terrorist cost a pittance compared to Typhoons and aircraft carriers. The issue of cost is, of course, highly relevant in these austere times. In fact, the big fear of most of those who have paid close attention to the SDSR is that it will be more about savings than strategy. While that is almost certain to be true, cost-cutting need not be a disaster. At this precise moment, Britain finds herself at a point where it is possible both to save money and enhance security.

In order to take advantage of this opportunity, however, the British people have collectively to abandon their ridiculous illusions of grandeur. As long as Britain persists in equating greatness with military power, she will continue to waste her money on weapons which make her no more secure. That, however, necessitates a paradigm shift probably beyond the capacity of the British people and their government.

A few days ago, General Sir Richard Dannatt, the former Chief of the General Staff, commenting on the SDSR, remarked that, within Britain, 'there is no real appetite to reduce further our role on the world stage'.

That is very true, but also very tragic.

• Gerard DeGroot is Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews