Constitutional reform is too important to be used as a ploy

GIVEN the prospect of a hung parliament on 7 May, Gordon Brown's commitment yesterday to constitutional change may be of huge significance in addition to the changes that such reform itself would bring. He is holding out the prospect of renewed reform of the House of Lords and reform of the voting system, both to be the subject of separate referendums, together with the introduction of fixed-term parliaments.

These are important commitments in their own right. But in playing strongly to the central concerns of the Lib Dems, Mr Brown has made a typically calculated move. By this, he hopes to secure Lib Dem support for Labour, enabling it to emerge as the party with a mandate to overcome the gridlock of a hung parliament. Even if the Lib Dem leader, Nick Clegg, will want to see which of the two main parties wins a greater share of the popular vote and thus has a claim to third-party support, many Lib Dem activists may feel Mr Brown's commitment gives him an edge over doing a deal with the Conservatives.

The SNP, meanwhile, was quick off the mark to make the point that, with Mr Brown now apparently won over to constitutional reform, he has effectively ceded the case for a referendum in Scotland on independence. The embrace of constitutional reform in other areas will be seen to weaken his position and the SNP will not be slow to exploit this perception at every opportunity.

What of the merits of the underlying changes? On House of Lords reform, the Blair administration did the easy bit – abolishing all but a handful of hereditary peers. Altogether more difficult is devising an all-elected second chamber in a way that does not weaken the Commons and enshrine constitutional conflict. How would an elected second chamber be delineated and how would it operate in a manner different from, and complementary to, the Commons? Resolving these complex issues is far from simple.

Voting reform commands broad support in principle, but there is wide disagreement over which particular system is to be adopted. Assuming a deal is reached, such reform will also require a change in the culture of the Commons towards the Holyrood model, which requires compromise, coalition agreements and, at the very least, understandings to enable a party with the most seats, though not an overall majority, to operate as a minority government.

Arguably as far-reaching is the proposal for fixed-term parliaments. While this will curb the power of the prime minister to determine the timing of an election, it will also mean a deeply unpopular government, or one wounded by crisis, cannot be forced into an early election by a Commons vote. The country would be stuck with an unwanted administration for the full term. Such a change, reducing the power and sanction of the Commons, is one many voters would regard as a dubious improvement of accountability. Attractive though any or all of these proposals may seem, they require the fullest debate. They deserve more than a calculated ploy by an unpopular administration to prolong its tenure.