Christian Jennings: Bosnian votes alone can never deliver stable government

WHEN the three million voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina wake up tomorrow morning, hopefully they will overcome significant electoral apathy to cast their ballots in parliamentary and presidential elections.

What then will be the best and worst case scenarios they will be voting for, and what is the most likely outcome for the country and its people?

The best-case scenario is the one described by Britain's Foreign Secretary William Hague in a joint statement issued late this week together with Dr Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart.

"Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sovereign European state. It lies in the heart of Europe and its people share a common European past. They deserve a European future: one where all Bosnian citizens have visa-free travel throughout the European Union, can sell their products in EU markets, enjoy education, earn decent wages and feel secure."

This sounds great - but will the politicians eventually elected realise their duty to their people?

As Messrs Hague and Westerwelle continue, "Bosnians of all ethnicities are being denied the same well being. This is not because the EU has slammed its door in the country's face… we argue that Bosnia's political representatives have failed to act in the interests of all Bosnians. A higher priority has been placed on localism, nationalism and narrow interests than on the well-being of the people of the country."

In a bewildering smorgasbord of choice, tomorrow, Bosnians will vote for the parliament of their central state, the parliaments of the two ethnically-based entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, the parliaments of their ten different cantons, and a rash of something like 14 presidents, prime ministers, vice-presidents and deputy prime-ministers. Around 600 officials expect to be returned in various political incarnations following the vote. Nobody expects any significant change on the political front.

Republika Srpska's secession-minded prime minister, Milorad Dodik, will almost certainly become president of the RS, and, emboldened by a recent ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, will up the ante on secessionist rhetoric.

High Representative Valentin Inzko, Bosnia's senior international overseer, has described any possible secession - which under the Dayton Peace Accords would be formally impossible anyway - as "a posthumous triumph for (late Serbian president] Slobodan Milosevic."

In the Federation, the SDA party of Suljeman Tihic should triumph at the polls, and the current Muslim member of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, Haris Sijadzic, a firm opponent of the entity structure, will continue holding his presidential wheel.

The problem with Bosnia is in this structure.The 15th anniversary of the end of the 1992-95 wars that tore apart the former Yugoslavia and left some 98,000 Muslims, Croats and Serbs dead falls this November: the Dayton Accords left Bosnia divided into two separate entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska.

The country's progress towards the EU and Nato membership has been slowed by logjams around key reform priorities and access to funding from the IMF and World Bank has been held up because reform conditions have not been met.

"The elections are therefore crucial," say Messrs Hague and Westerwelle. "It is up to Bosnian citizens to choose who will lead and represent their country over the next four years … make clear to the politicians you elect that you expect them to move the country forward and to deliver social and economic improvements; and that you will judge them on the basis of the reforms they deliver, not the reforms they block."

Therein lies the political-economic rub.

"There are perverse incentives in the current system," says Kurt Bassuener, a leading international policy analyst, "which allow politicians to remain unaccountable. For that, we need deep constitutional reform, which the international community can't dictate, but can guide. The bottom line is that until Bosnia has a popularly legitimate system which each self-defined group feels can protect and pursue its interests, it won't be stable enough to remove the international stabilising role."