Bomb site

My former colleague at EMBT/RMJM, Mick Duncan, called for the details justifying the decision to extend the Scottish Parliament building to be made public (Letters, 23 January). Can I take this opportunity to second that request?

I was EMBT/RMJM’s Edinburgh-based project architect on the parliament for the full duration of the project between 1998 and 2004.

I know more than most about the security requirements of the building and yet having reviewed the drawings of the new proposals I cannot at all see how they improve security at the complex. In fact, by placing the new extension within the “bomb blast” exclusion zone around the perimeter of the building they may actually achieve quite the opposite.

The creeping fortification of the building is a major concern. We worked hard in designing the building to ensure that the security requirements were carefully integrated into the architectural concept.

For example, vehicle stand-off distances (to keep potential ram-raiders sufficiently far away from the building to minimise injuries and damage should a car bomb be detonated) were achieved by placing the ponds in Horse Wynd between the road and the building.

The crass addition a couple of years ago of a continuous line of bollards along the full frontage of Horse Wynd and Canongate made a mockery of our approach, the crudely overt security requirements presumably justified as a means of discouraging potential terrorism even though no actual physical improvement in the stand-off distance is achieved.

We are now faced with the prospect of an even worse addition to the building that again appears, on the basis of my extensive knowledge of the building, to offer little tangible security benefit.

Why is this scheme being proposed?

John Kinsley

Regent Street

Portobello