Phillips O’Brien: SNP defence policies depend on being in Nato

Reports that SNP party leaders are considering abandoning their policy of withdrawing from Nato in the run up to the 2014 independence referendum should not be a surprise, as it is only within Nato that the SNP’s defence policies can work militarily and politically. Scotland could undoubtedly exist independently within or outside of Nato. There are similarly-sized European countries that have taken each path.

Norway and Denmark are two North Sea-bordering, and in the case of Norway oil-rich, nations of approximately five million people who have integrated themselves fully into Nato and played a major role in Nato’s military operations.

On the other hand the Republic of Ireland, an eastern Atlantic nation of 4.5 million, exists happily outside of the alliance while 7.8 million Swiss citizens live an affluent and comfortable non-Nato life. Nor can it be said that there is any specific international threat that would require Scotland to be in Nato.

In the European context the only possible threat close to Scotland is an aggressive Russia looking to enforce its claims in northern waters. However the likelihood of a military confrontation is small in the short term, and it is impossible to imagine any such move without a Nato lead response. Unless the international situation changes drastically, therefore, Scotland could today live safely outside of Nato.

However the defence policies that the SNP has announced to this time are not those of a non-aligned Ireland or Switzerland, but are much closer to those of Nato members Denmark and Norway. For instance, one of the regularly stated policies of the SNP is to maintain Faslane as Scotland’s major naval, and probably multi-use, base. In domestic political terms this is crucial for the SNP, as the votes of tens of thousands of those in the West of Scotland are linked to the future of Faslane. It is the largest single employer in its area, supports thousands of jobs, and brings many millions of pounds into what is not a rich part of Scotland. Closing or even significantly down-sizing the base could have dramatic local economic repercussions.

Yet an independent, non-Nato Scotland as heretofore envisaged by the SNP would find Faslane to be the worst possible location for its one major naval base. An independent Scotland would have one over-riding naval priority, the defence of the North Sea oilfields and facilities which provide the income from which many SNP economic assumptions are based.

Those assets, if they are not to be attacked by another country could be the target of sabotage or terrorism. Faslane is uniquely placed to be almost inaccessible to the North Sea by naval vessel. It would take more than a day for most naval vessels to leave port in Faslane and reach the east coast, by which time any terrorist attack would have succeeded or ended. If Scotland is to be independent and non-Nato and maintain only one large naval base, as the SNP says now, that naval base would have to be on the east coast within easy reach of the oil fields. Anything else would be irresponsible.

If an independent Scotland remained within Nato then there would be a fully integrated defence alliance which would be obligated by treaty to help with the defence of this area. Though it would still make sense for Scotland to maintain some naval vessels itself on the east coast, basing the great bulk of Scotland’s naval assets in Faslane would not be unthinkable. It is a superb facility with some of the most up-to date technology in the world. It could serve as a very attractive Nato-based multi-use facility. It is the base of a major Nato player which the non-Nato independent Scotland would maintain mostly as an exercise in state welfare.

One of the other reasons that the SNP might be reconsidering its commitment to leave Nato is that much of its defence policies, particularly its desire to be a non-nuclear country, are based on the cooperation of England. Whatever the rhetoric might say, if Scotland becomes independent, the United Kingdom would be changed fundamentally and could easily cease to exist. Basically you would be left with an English state.

Yet the SNP is assuming that this English state would desire to maintain the present defence posture of the old United Kingdom. For instance, they are hoping that the nuclear weapons now based in Faslane would be claimed by England and transferred down south. However there is no guarantee that England alone would wish to be one of the world’s nuclear powers. Not only would England’s claim to a UN Security council veto, one of the reasons that the UK has continued to maintain a nuclear force, become slightly ludicrous, there has periodically been large domestic pressures internally in England to get rid of these weapons.

An England in this present state of austerity and budget cuts and angered by a Scotland that has broken up the union, might not claim the weapons. For Scotland to become non-nuclear, it needs to have a cooperative relationship with England. Staying in Nato would be one way to reassure England that Scotland was serious about its European defence responsibilities.

Finally there is the question of equipment and personnel. The present military forces in Scotland have been developed with a Nato role in mind. The soldiers, sailors and air personnel in them have signed up to a force partly because it is a force with a worldwide role, and the experience that this brings. A non-Nato Scotland would be about as interesting a military experience for these soldiers as pub football match would be for a premier league player. This matters, as many of the soldiers in the Royal Regiment of Scotland are not Scottish. Why they would wish to stay in a force which would rarely stray south of Gretna or north of the Shetlands is not immediately apparent. A non-Nato Scotland could have to recruit and equip a completely new military force.

In the end, staying in Nato, while it might be a bitter pill to some of the more ideological members of the SNP, is the only way to make sense of the party’s defence policies.

• Phillips O’Brien is director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow