Brian Taylor: Labour’s home rule battle

Tony Blair celebrates with voters in Parliament Square, Edinburgh, after Scotland voted Yes/Yes vote in 1997. Picture: Allan Milligan

IN PURSUIT of foresight, try hindsight. In particular, cast a backwards glance to Scotland’s last referendum, in 1997. Next year’s independence ballot is pre-legislative – an advance mandate to be based upon a white paper. That, quite consciously, follows the 1997 precedent. By contrast, the referendum in 1979 was post-legislative.

The 1997 referendum was called by Tony Blair’s Labour government, but its genesis lay long before that. The Constitutional Convention had involved Labour, the Liberal Democrats and many others in drafting a workable self-government scheme.

Historically, Labour had wrestled with Scottish home rule. Some felt it conflicted with the ideology of international socialism, while others feared an unwarranted concession to the SNP. But there was a further element at play: should Labour ride solo – or co-operate with others?

Labour’s default position had tended towards sole control. While dominating Scottish ranks at Westminster, the party saw itself, hubristically or otherwise, as Scotland’s guardian. If there had to be change, Labour would take charge.

There were always key figures in Labour who advocated devolution from principle, who urged cross-party co-operation to broaden appeal. Nonetheless, I believe we can see a transition in Labour’s default stance. Now and for the coming referendum, support for Scottish devolution is firmly fixed within Scottish Labour. Now and for the coming referendum, Labour will co-operate with others in countering independence. But back to 1997. The origin of the referendum lay not in certainty, but in apprehension. Team Blair scarcely yearned for devolution. However, it concluded it must act in order to address disquiet in Scotland and stem the SNP.

Which left two concerns. One, would devolution clog up the parliamentary timetable for an incoming Labour government? Two, was the party vulnerable on tax? The Conservative Scottish secretary Michael Forsyth had been effective in targeting the “tartan tax”, the proposed power for the Scottish Parliament to vary income tax.

Tony Blair’s prime narrative was founded on countering any impression that Labour favoured tax and spend. And so Team Blair fretted that the tartan tax created a Caledonian weak point. The solution? A referendum seeking a popular mandate to pre-empt blocking tactics at Westminster – with a distinct question on tax powers, aimed at neutralising the Tory campaign.

Disclosure of the plan in 1996 caused a furious row. Those closest to Blair say he anticipated precisely such a development, but was unmoved. One told me Blair found sections of his Scottish party irritating – and the Scottish media impossible. As I recall, he used slightly blunter language. The row featured factional fury and moments of pure farce. The tax question, in particular, was depicted by some inside Labour as a wrecking tactic, as evidence that their leadership colleagues were intrinsically hostile to home rule.

After a tumultuous period for George Robertson, as shadow Scottish secretary, the controversy subsided. But, while it burned, it was fierce. To truncate: Labour won the election, the convention scheme was translated into a detailed government white paper, and that was put to the people of Scotland in the referendum.

Similarities? Most fundamentally, later this year, the Scottish Government will publish a white paper, a prospectus for independence, to be tested by referendum. But there is one further comparison: campaign compromise.

The SNP is working with others in Yes Scotland – including, for example, the Greens, who offer a different take on independence.

Those parties advocating the Union will require to subsume their differences – including over the constitution – in order to pursue their common cause. Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives are, variously, advancing possible enhancements to Holyrood’s powers but, at this stage, there is little sign of a common package. Rather, there is a core objective: defeat independence, secure the Union. Something similar applied in 1997, particularly for those advocating a Yes/Yes vote: Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Consider the potential for that campaign going awry. Imagine if the Lib Dems had spent every waking hour saying: “Well, we’ll put up with this, but we really want a federal UK.” Or, if the Nationalists had said: “We’ll tolerate this, but it’s useless compared to independence.” Or, indeed, if Labour had said: “We don’t care. Back us or else.”

The Lib Dems had already worked with Labour in the convention. It was, however, a very different story for the SNP. Albeit temporarily, it would be backing a proposal that some in the party felt was a cul de sac, diverting independence. The SNP leader, Alex Salmond, needed assurances. He says he was given a guarantee by Donald Dewar, repeated in the Commons, that there would be no formal obstacle placed in the path of independence, that the people of Scotland would be free to choose such a path, if they desired.

The Yes/Yes campaign, under the banner Scotland Forward, faced the customary alarums and excursions. But we can perhaps discern three key problems. One, an awkward launch, overshadowed by an internal Labour row. Two, and much more fundamental, that second question: tax – and whether the proposed parliament should have the power to vary it.

To the very end of the campaign, Dewar fretted that the second question might be lost. He believed it was counter-intuitive to confront voters with a potential new tax without any specific spending plan attached.

This apparently provoked internal tension. According to Labour insiders, Dewar did not want any stress upon the tax issue at all – while others in the Labour leadership argued that the party should pre-empt the problem by ruling out any use of the tartan tax, if Labour came to power.

But there emerged a third – and far greater – challenge. On 31 August, 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, died after a car crash in Paris. The sustained outburst of emotional mourning swamped all else. The devolution vote was due within a fortnight. Should the referendum be postponed?

I recall phoning Dewar that Sunday. He was, frankly, at a loss. Common decency and, perhaps, public sentiment argued for postponement. But plans for the ballot were considerably advanced. Plus, delaying the Scottish vote might also mean holding off on the Welsh referendum, due a week later.

After consultation, the referendum went ahead as planned, but campaigning was suspended for a week.

Let me now turn to the other side, to those advocating a double No vote. The Conservative attitude towards legislative self-government had been outright opposition. In the event, though, Conservative involvement in the No campaign was indirect and tangential.

After the 1997 election, the Scottish Tories made it plain that they had neither the funds nor the inclination to organise  a full-scale No campaign of  their own.

And so the No campaign that emerged was largely drawn together by key individuals, such as Brian Monteith. Lord Fraser was appointed director, acting as the conduit from the Conservative Party.

The campaign’s title was Think Twice. On the one hand, that represented an implicit concession that the Yes camp was in the lead. The message was: think deeply, don’t rush. But it also represented an oblique nod towards the tax question. The message? “OK, so maybe you are going to say Yes to a parliament. But Think Twice – and turn down tax powers.”

With relatively few foot-soldiers, Think Twice nevertheless campaigned vigorously, chiefly through advertising. To little avail.

On 11 September, 1997, the people of Scotland voted. The pattern was clear but the final result was delayed, with the Highland count particularly prolonged.

The BBC’s results programme stayed on air throughout the night, discussing ever more obscure topics. I recall resorting to poetry at one point. Finally, we surrendered at dawn, handing over to colleagues. And, of course, Highland instantly declared. The people of Scotland had said Yes and Yes again.

• Brian Taylor is BBC Scotland’s political editor. His lecture is at 5:30pm today at the University of Glasgow. http://www.gla.ac.uk/events/voxpopuli