Analysis: Iraq unity weakened by strongman Nouri al-Maliki

SINCE the last US troops left Iraq, Shia prime minister Nouri al-Maliki has ordered the arrest of the country’s highest-ranking Sunni official, threatened to exclude the rival sect’s main party from his government and warned “rivers of blood” would flow if Sunnis seek an autonomous region.

The developments confirm what many observers have suspected since Mr Maliki came to office more than five years ago – that he has an authoritarian streak and is an essentially sectarian figure.

The first casualty could be the unity government he heads, which took nine months after elections in March last year to put together, under heavy US pressure to include the Sunnis.

But Mr Maliki did not like it, and has made clear he aims to retain a strong grip. “I have been working here for six years and I will be here for another six,” he said recently.

He has been accruing power since coming to office in 2006 in a process that has accelerated since the new government was formed a year ago. He effectively runs the defence and interior ministries and has created a separate security force that answers to him alone. He has by-passed parliament to install Shia allies in key positions, and he has used his control over state resources to gain leverage with the judiciary and supervisory agencies such as the integrity commission.

The one risk he runs is that he will disillusion Shia parties, some of which are political rivals. On Monday, one MP in the party of radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr suggested new elections to resolve the turmoil. Bahaa al-Aaraji quickly backed off the idea, saying it was just his personal opinion, but his comment underlined how Shia rivals could rebuff the prime minister. Nevertheless, for the moment, Shia parties are strongly backing Mr Maliki, unified by their common fear that Sunnis want to take back power that their minority community lost with the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein.

Last week, the Shia bloc issued a statement saying rulings of the judiciary must be adhered to, language that was seen as a show of support for Mr Maliki’s arrest warrant against Sunni vice-president and critic Tariq al-Hashemi.

Mr Maliki accuses Mr Hashemi of running death squads. Mr Hashemi denies the charges. The Iraqiya bloc to which he belongs is boycotting parliament, complaining that Mr Maliki does not share power, and it is threatening to pull out of the unity government.

For Sunnis, the moves stoke fears that the majority Shiites want to exclude them. They also worry that increasing Shia power will translate into greater influence from neighbouring, Shiite-led Iran.

Mr Maliki, meanwhile, has been able to exploit Shia fears of a Sunni resurgence to keep his coalition together while he expands his personal role. Helping him is the lack of any credible Shia rival, with former premier Ibrahim al-Jaafari and former vice-president Adil Abdel-Mahdi viewed as too weak to take his job.

The fear is that Mr Maliki’s anti-Sunni offensive could re-ignite the sectarian violence that tore the country apart in 2006 and 2007. Without the Americans acting as a buffer, an explosion of violence now could be even worse.

“The man is becoming more authoritarian, because he feels the coalition is uncomfortable,” warned political analyst Kadhum al-Muqdadi. “He should ideally be for all Iraqis, not just his sect.”