Iraq: Has it really all been worth it?

AS British combat operations come to an end after more than six years, our team of experts look back at the UK's decision to go to war and examine whether our involvement has achieved anything really worthwhile.

Stuart Crawford, a former army officer who served in the first Gulf war

PURPORTEDLY there in support of Britain's foreign policy and in defence of our "national interests", the reality is that our troops were committed by nave and mendacious politicians in support of America's pathological pursuit of anyone and anything which might possibly be deemed an enemy post the Twin Towers attack.

The second Gulf war never had the popular support that the first conflict there in 1991 had. It had all the signs of failure from the beginning – the "sexed up" dossier on WMDs, a lack of international support, and the dubious legality of the intervention. Small wonder that the bulk of the British population was, and remains, deeply cynical about the whole debacle.

What have we achieved there? Not much, really. Iraq remains divided along historical fault lines and must surely split eventually, with the Kurds in the north, the Sunnis in the west, and the Shias in the south and east forming their own autonomous states. In the meantime, the raw and inexperienced Iraqi security forces will try to maintain some sort of peace and stability. How successful they will be remains to be seen, but I'm not holding my breath.

Has it all been worth the 179 British combat deaths there? Most emphatically not.

Jabbar Hasan, director of the Iraqi Association of United Kingdom

THE action of the British troops and the wider coalition which was involved in removing Saddam Hussein from power was definitely worth it for us as Iraqis.

He was a dictator, everyone knew about his atrocities, not only directed towards his own people but at neighbouring countries as well.

But it is a different story if we look at the time after his removal. War was the only way that the international community could remove him but they created a different monster in his place.

Iraq has moved on a little, but not in every area. If you look at Basra, where the British have been for six years, security may be better but nothing else is. The people are more secure but they don't have electricity, drinking water, sewers or health care.

George Bush promised a democratic paradise but we haven't got that. It took us eight months to elect a speaker in the parliament and that is a result of the sectarian, ethnic divisions within Iraq.

Clive Fairweather, former SAS deputy commander

THE one positive thing from the coalition's campaign was that it removed a sadistic tyrant from power. But, in turn, the Iraqi people have had to endure huge loss of life and upheaval, with uncertainty likely to hang over the country – if it survives as a sovereign entity – for generations. Whether it has been worth the loss of Iraqi, US and British lives remains to be seen, as, indeed, does the overall legality of our intervention.

Tactically, British forces made a gallant and professional contribution but, after the initial assault, never really ever had enough boots on the ground to make a significant and sustained difference.

In the end, it was American and Iraqi soldiers temporarily flooding Basra 12 months ago that may have made the real strategic advance in the south. Meanwhile, our forces had withdrawn to the airport and again became political pawns in Anglo-American relations – the real reason Tony Blair involved them in the first place, rather than so-called weapons of mass destruction. The army's lack of impact towards the end has also disappointed the Americans and not impressed the Iraqis either. For the British Army, it is a sorry tale that can nevertheless be reflected on with pride, at least until recently. We are about to make these same mistakes again in Afghanistan by not providing enough troops to finish the job.

Eric Joyce, the Labour MP for Falkirk and a former major in the British Army

THE original decision to deploy our forces was controversial and, while made in good faith, based in part on flawed intelligence assessments. Now, however, as we leave, we should stock-take.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whom I met in Baghdad, runs a country with lively politics and a growing economy; President Barzani in northern Iraq has been a considerable success and much new investment is flowing in from places like Turkey. Vital public services, like education and health, are on a trajectory which will take them to where they would have been today had Saddam not turned Iraq into a dictatorship; there is a vibrant trade union movement; Iraqis are free from the torture and oppression of the Saddam years.

Most people agree, although not all, that it would have been unacceptable to stand back over the years and allow Saddam to continue to brutalise his people – he would still be there today had we not stopped him. Most people agree, too, that the threat to regional stability Saddam posed was serious and needed to be stopped. The best armed services in the world, our own, have ensured that the Iraqis have a prosperous future to look forward to and, even more importantly, they have protected our own security too. We welcome them home with pride, following a job well done.

Rev Ian Galloway, convener of the Church of Scotland's church and society council

OUR first thoughts have to be for those who have died, and to all the families in Iraq, the UK and the USA who mourn them. The future will reveal to them and to all of us what kind of Iraq emerges from the war and the aftermath, and in what kind of Middle East.

Meantime, we can recall that the way into war was deeply flawed and has left a legacy of distrust in government communication and intelligence, as well as casting a shadow over the reputation of Tony Blair in particular. We have been assured that the road to war was paved, like that other infamous pathway, with good intentions. It is futile now to speculate on what might have happened, had weapons inspectors been able to complete their task and the UN equipped to seek to enforce change on the Hussein regime through other than violent means. The damage that has been caused to democracy and to the global partnership are a huge price to have paid for the decisions taken.

Paul Wilkinson, professor of international relations, St Andrews University

BRITAIN'S armed forces performed their duties in Iraq with professionalism and courage, but future historians are likely to conclude that they were sent to fight the wrong war with inadequate equipment and not enough troops.

The invasion of Iraq was sold to the American and British public on a false prospectus. There was no evidence that the Saddam regime had any part in the 9/11 attack. There was no evidence that Saddam was a threat to his neighbours or British targets. His regime was the most contained of all the dictatorships. It was the target of economic sanctions and a no-fly regime.

If George Bush and Tony Blair had waited for the experienced and dedicated UN weapons inspectors to complete their task, they would have learned that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. The neo-conservative aim of regime change to impose a western-style democracy on Iraq was not permitted under the UN Charter and was hopelessly unrealistic.

By diverting so much military force to the Iraq war, the coalition failed to follow through the toppling of the Taleban in Afghanistan by capturing the al-Qaeda leadership. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda was able to use the war as a major propaganda and recruitment weapon.