Failings of an empire in denial

Penguin, 20

THE argument over whether there really is an "American empire" is simultaneously futile and important. Important, because recognising the existence of an American imperial project is essential to the long-term success of US foreign policy; and futile because efforts at convincing Americans that such a project exists founder upon their obstinate refusal to admit that the United States is, and has been for almost its entire existence, an empire.

Power and empire may not be quite the same thing but the distinction between them is less apparent than policymakers in Washington affect to believe. This does not trouble historian Niall Ferguson, who has "no objection in principle to an American empire. Indeed part of my argument is that many parts of the world would benefit from a period of American rule."

Still, as Ferguson neatly puts it, much of US foreign policy post-Second World War was predicated upon the principle of "the imperialism of anti-imperialism". This was not altogether new. After all, while decrying the lingering presence of European empires in the western hemisphere, the Founding Fathers were perfectly keen on expanding the United States across the entire North American continent. One might also note, more recently, that Ronald Reagan’s description of the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire" rather invited a contrast with the benevolence of the American empire.

Ferguson demonstrates the unprecedented military and financial clout the United States possesses. Yet, if this is an unchained empire, it is still bound by ropes. Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War massively increased America’s global hegemony but weakened the western alliance. Free from the threat of Soviet annihilation, Europe - emboldened by its federalist ambitions - could have more room for independent manoeuvre.

For all the US’s military and economic advantages, its power is enhanced when it acts in alliance with other countries. The EU, Ferguson concludes, is not as yet a viable counterweight to America, but a withdrawal of European support for the idea of an American-led liberal empire greatly weakens US chances of success.

Well known for his regular television appearances, Ferguson gave up his Oxford professorship almost two years ago to take up one in New York. Now scarcely a fortnight seems to pass without another Ferguson piece appearing on America’s leading opinion and editorial pages. And only last month, he was named by Time magazine as one of the world’s hundred most influential "leaders and thinkers", prompting him to speculate wryly upon the imminent bursting of the Ferguson bubble. This pleasingly provocative book suggests there’s air left in it yet.

The problem with the United States, Ferguson argues, is that it has not proved an effective imperial power. Too often it has shown itself unable to stay the course. Any survey of Latin America - where Woodrow Wilson once vowed "to teach them to elect good men" - demonstrates the inadequacies of the American imperial experience. This brings us back to our starting point: unless the United States grasps the nature of its international commitments - in other words, unless it backs words with actions - it will remain an ineffective imperial power. Where it has done so - as in West Germany, Japan and South Korea - it has had some success. Elsewhere, the record is depressingly threadbare.

Ferguson thus believes it essential that the US remain in Iraq for the long haul. Washington might promise to leave, as Britain did with Egypt, but should not do so. Sometimes hypocrisy is a virtue. Ferguson welcomed the invasion and liberation of Iraq but frets that the US’s "attention deficit disorder" will imperil winning the peace.

As Ferguson puts it, an empire "in denial" and purchased "on the cheap" cannot achieve its own ambitions. That in turn requires a recognition that the US is an empire in the first place. Alas, as noted before, empire is the reality that dare not raise its voice in public. Squaring this circle requires an honest appraisal of US history and its future foreign policy. It also requires American policymakers to dedicate themselves to nation-building. Somalia and Haiti are twin stains on recent American foreign policy. Both were caused by a failure of tactical nerve and a lack of strategic awareness.

If there are times when Ferguson’s tone comes close to that of a disenchanted schoolmaster perplexed at his pupils’ wilful refusal to pay attention in class, that may merely reflect the gravity of the subject matter at hand. The old world still has some tricks it can teach the new - even if his hope is that a liberal American empire will possess the globalising strengths of its British predecessor without being hamstrung by its prejudices.

Like Ferguson’s other books, Colossus is conceived on a grand, even breathtaking scale, as the author roams across the prairies of history. Although parts of this book build on previously published journalism, his narrative is as imaginative as it is insightful. Few other accounts of this subject, for example, take account of the possible impact on America’s future foreign policy objectives of the nation’s looming $45 trillion social security nightmare, as the post-war baby boomer generation retires.

Such a detour into the fiscal crisis the US has in store may betray Ferguson’s background as an economic historian, but it is also a reminder that domestic concerns, above and beyond the realities of the electoral cycle, cannot be ignored in an analysis of the nature and longevity of any "pax Americana", even if it is true that, at the moment, "America’s nascent liberal empire is surprisingly inexpensive to run".

This book will not be the last word on the questions Ferguson asks, but whether one approves of America’s imperial adventures or not, Colossus ought to be required reading for anyone with an interest in the reality of the world as it is today and the world that is yet to come.

Best of all, it will irritate and provoke readers on each side of the Atlantic. Those who despair at the folly of America’s imperial mission and those who support the US will find plenty of ammunition with which to bolster their arguments in this vigorous, penetrating and muscularly provocative analysis of American strength and weakness.

Ferguson closes on a gloomy note. Quoting Kipling’s lines on how "all our pomp of yesterday/ Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!" Ferguson ponders: "The question Americans must ask themselves is just how transient they wish their predominance to be. Though the barbarians have already knocked at the gates - once, spectacularly - imperial decline in this case seems more likely to come, as it came to Gibbon’s Rome, from within."

The same, he might have added, was true of the other great Anglophone empire that Ferguson hopes can, in good times and bad, inspire the United States.