Jaswant Singh: Asian giants may talk but much vital is left unsaid

'Tzu-Ch'in said to Tzu-Kung: Our Master gets things (done] by being cordial, frank, courteous, temperate, deferential. That is our ... way." But will Chinese premier Wen Jiabao live up to that standard, as conveyed in the Analects of Confucius, on his current visit to India?

In looking toward the future of Asia - and, indeed, the future of world diplomacy - it is the relationship between the world's two most populous countries and largest emerging economies, India and China, which will increasingly set the global agenda. Japan's change of military doctrine for the first time since the start of the Cold War - a shift that implicitly makes China the greatest threat - suggests the Chinese leadership needs to take a hard look at its regional grand strategy.

Mr Wen's priorities for his trip to India are clear: trade, security, and, far behind, the territorial disputes between the two countries. Such an approach might make tactical diplomatic sense, but it lacks a sense of strategic urgency, which, given rising international tensions across Asia, amounts to a serious strategic blunder.

The sources of those tensions are clear: North Korea's shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island and its flaunting of a modern, previously unknown, nuclear plant; the US-led armada now cruising through the South China and Yellow Sea; and China's claim that the South China Sea is an area of vital national interest akin to Tibet.

In its bilateral relations with India, China's shift in focus from its claims on the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh to Jammu and Kashmir is worrisome. Indeed, around Gilgit in Kashmir, China's People's Liberation Army has enhanced its troop presence.

But, despite all this diplomatic friction, Mr Wen's entourage is dominated by a large business delegation. Currently, both countries' economies are thrusting forward; both are thirsty for more and bigger markets.

India is growing at an annual rate of around 9 per cent; China at around 10 per cent. So the opportunities for trade between the two are enormous. But, for both, economic growth is not hurdle-free.

India's economy is growing, but faces rising inflation, fiscal and current-account deficits, a slowdown in agricultural growth, and infrastructure bottlenecks. China's problems arise mainly from widening income disparities, which are inciting hitherto unheard of levels of labour unrest.

But such labour unrest and the desire to maintain growth suggest China should be taking the lead in ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and preventing other political developments from derailing its economy.After all, as the Chinese leadership knows, only continued strong growth will provide the government with the wriggle room it needs to begin to revalue it currency.

Revaluation of its currency is necessary in part because the undervalued renminbi has become yet another a source of friction in Asia, as many in the region now believe the Chinese are using their currency as a "policy weapon".

Yet China's international grand strategy does not appear to reflect this. Instead, it remains focused on north-east Asia, Tibet, Taiwan, and its aspirations to move into the Indian Ocean, that great global highway of trade in the 21st century.

China's leaders recognise their country needs time, space, and peace for economic development. Yet their pursuit of a dominant naval position on the strategic chokepoints in the Indian Ocean undermines these goals by raising tensions. Their focus on inhibiting India seems particularly misguided, given that China's core interests - Tibet, Taiwan, and the heartland of the Chinese mainland - are far beyond the reach of most of India's military capabilities.

By contrast, India's most important national security concerns - the unsettled border between the two countries, and Beijing's ties with Pakistan, which often operates as a Chinese surrogate - are closely connected to China. India's concerns also focus on China's ongoing supply of arms, including missiles and nuclear weapons technology, to Pakistan.

China may take comfort in remaining focused on non-core issues, because such an approach suggests tactical cooperation with India. That is a convenient international ploy, but it leaves the sources of bilateral discord unattended.

• Jaswant Singh is a former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defence minister.