Sam Ghibaldan: A flawed response that fools no-one

One of the least edifying aspects of politics is the unerring ability of some politicians to give the impression of dodgy dealings as they go about their daily business. By failing to deny the suggestion – and being very careful in his choice of words – Prime Minster David Cameron has left the impression that his decision to overrule health advice to introduce plain packaging for cigarettes was influenced by his chief election strategist’s lobbying contract with a large tobacco company.

We don’t know whether the accusation against the Prime Minister is accurate. But with our current knowledge of events, it seems the only convincing explanation of the decision to abandon a policy that may help curb smoking and save lives. After all, it is only the tobacco companies that could be damaged by the measure.

Predictably, the UK government has responded by reiterating its proposal to introduce a register of consultant lobbyists, claiming it will boost public confidence about outside influence on government decision-making.

Do the government really believe that? In this case, precisely the opposite is true. It is the knowledge that the Conservatives’ chief election strategist owns a lobbying firm that is contracted to a tobacco company that is undermining public confidence in the decision-making process.

Clearly that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be told of the existence of such lobbyists close to politicians, but just knowing about them solves nothing. In practice, the proposal for a register of lobbyists is flawed as it is both impracticable and, if the objective is to improve confidence in political decision-making, it is a telescope focused on the wrong end of the problem.

So who counts as a lobbyist? Well, the government’s draft bill refers to consultant lobbyists. That presumably covers those working for a public affairs consultancy, but what about those directly employed by businesses, pressure groups or charities? Or a business executive who presses their case either in a meeting with a government minister, or after buying a ticket to sit next to one at a party dinner?

They seem to fall outside the terms of the draft bill, perhaps understandably given the rigmarole of registering and the vast number of people that might otherwise be covered, but in practice such individuals do lobby government. So, if they are not covered is a register really going to show who is influencing policy?

Apart from being an extra cost and additional bureaucracy, a register of lobbyists might not do much harm, but neither will it do much good. It is a policy designed simply to give the impression of action: a response, not a reform. Perhaps, by considering the problem in terms of lobbyists, we are looking at the symptoms instead of the disease. If the concern is that political decisions are subject to inappropriate external influence, we need to know who ministers are talking to.

Therefore it would make more sense for ministers to publish full lists of the policy meetings they have with external bodies. To be useful, the topics discussed should also be made public.

That would not be sufficient by itself. In the current case of tobacco companies and plain cigarette packaging, the contact with ministers was through party rather than government channels. Indeed, policy is not just influenced through members of the government; it can be by lobbying backbenchers in parliament, or party staff during the manifesto preparation process. To be thorough, therefore, any rules would need to cover all politicians, their parties and for that matter, civil servants.

Phew. That might provide transparency, but it’s a lot of additional bureaucracy and expense. You can begin to see why the government thought it might be easier to fob the public off with a register of consultant lobbyists.

Is there, then, a better solution? Well, yes. At the heart of concerns about lobbying is not so much the fact that external interests are able to influence political decisions – it is, after all, important that they can – but rather that they can purchase influence.

Not, of course, that direct bribery is involved. Businesses, wealthy individuals – and in the case of Labour, trades unions – all give money to political parties, in the deniable expectation that they will be given some influence on policy later. Is that a cynical interpretation? Well, many politicians consistently remind us, that they don’t believe in a “something for nothing” culture.

Why are politicians so desperate for money? Let’s be fair, it isn’t because they are personally benefiting. Neither, I suspect, do many of them enjoy the uncomfortable fact they have to sit down at dinners with business people or trade unionists and have their ears bent in return for cash.

But the bottom line is that political parties need money to function and to win elections. If that is perceived to have a negative impact on British politics at the moment, you only need to look at the US to see how pernicious it can become if it isn’t stopped.

To address that problem, rules limiting election spending have been introduced in the UK. The current draft bill seeks to further limit direct spending by third parties. But why not go further and reduce overall election spending levels significantly? That might even force parties to focus on issues rather than razzmatazz in elections.

In parallel, donations to political parties from any source over a very low level – say £1,000 – could be banned, with a modest amount of state funding provided instead. In relative terms the state funding required would be a very small amount, a price worth paying to protect and improve our politics. It is far more likely to have a substantial impact than a register of consultant lobbyists.

• Sam Ghibaldan is a former special adviser to Liberal Democrat ministers in the Scottish Government