Could Boris’s ‘Celtic Bridge’ really go the distance? – Jacqueline Cook

Engineering issues aside, there are significant legal hurdles in the way of an Irish Sea crossing, writes Jacqueline Cook
The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge has a 55km span (Picture: AFP/Getty)The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge has a 55km span (Picture: AFP/Getty)
The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge has a 55km span (Picture: AFP/Getty)

Last month the Prime Minister’s office announced a “proper piece of work” was under way to consider the feasibility of a ‘Celtic bridge’ between Scotland and Northern Ireland. The news was met with a mixture of scorn (from those suspecting a Government diversionary tactic) to delight (from those who view the bridge as an economic catalyst for the area). As a planning lawyer, my focus is on the consenting implications of such a project, which are, to put it mildly, significant.

The bridge would be at least 20 miles (32km) long. This is achievable in engineering terms (the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge has a 55km span) but the likely need for new infrastructure and transport connections at either end raises questions about how to navigate the associated regulatory minefield.

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Under current rules, the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 and Transport and Works regimes would likely cover many of the works involved for the bridge, up to the limits of planning authority jurisdiction on land. Scottish ministers would retain responsibility for marine licensing and enforcement in Scotland’s inshore and offshore regions, up to 200 nautical miles out to sea.

Jacqueline Cook is head of planning at Davidson Chalmers StewartJacqueline Cook is head of planning at Davidson Chalmers Stewart
Jacqueline Cook is head of planning at Davidson Chalmers Stewart

However, the relevant law and policy are in transition. The Planning (Scotland) Act 2019, passed last July, affects terrestrial consenting. A National Planning Framework update, setting out Scottish development priorities, is imminent. The regulation of marine areas around inhabited islands is also changing under the Islands (Scotland) Act 2018. It is hard at this juncture to see how consenting the Scottish end of a Celtic bridge would work in practice.

In Northern Ireland, local planning authorities operating under the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 devolved regime would be the main consenting bodies on-shore while the Marine Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 governs development up to the boundary of UK territorial seas. Marine licensing for Northern Irish inshore waters is controlled by the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland but anything 12-200 miles offshore lies within the jurisdiction of the England-based Marine Management Organisation. In the inter-tidal zone on both sides of the Irish Sea, there is an overlap where both the terrestrial planning and marine licensing regimes would apply.

Owners of the foreshore would also need to be involved in any Celtic bridge planning. Much of this land is held by the Crown with the remainder owned by local planning authorities, harbour authorities, private estates or landowners. With so many stakeholders, how promoters of a bridge would even begin the public consultation exercise or approach any required compulsory purchase of land for the project makes the mind boggle.

Further complications include the nature of the waters between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Beaufort’s Dyke is a 200-300 metre deep channel in the middle of the Irish Sea which one of the proposed links between Portpatrick and Larne would cross over. This presents a significant engineering challenge even before post-war munitions dumping raises the prospect of unexploded ordnance. There are also potential environmental and navigational sensitivities to consider, ones which could require co-operation at a supranational level.

The international implications for such a project must also be considered with the UK’s departure from the EU. The UK and the European Commission agree, in principle, that there should be no hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, if the UK’s current intention is to leave the single market and customs union, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would effectively become the EU’s external border. It is not known how the movement of people and goods across that border would work or how a bridge between Scotland and Northern Ireland might impact on that. The associated security and logistical risks would require careful consideration, alongside environmental concerns and the physical constraints of building in the Irish Sea.

While building a Celtic bridge would not be impossible, it would be significantly complicated. With conservative estimates suggesting a £20bn price tag, it would also be extremely expensive. Given the spiralling costs of HS2, we might question whether the Government has a genuine appetite for large, controversial infrastructure project such as this – and if this is a serious proposal in the first place.

Jacqueline Cook is head of planning at Davidson Chalmers Stewart