Analysis: Snow revolutionaries must play the smart card

But, while the similarities between these two popular movements are palpable, their differences are essential.

Like the Snow Revolution, the Orange Revolution was a broad middle-class reaction against corruption and the absence of the rule of law. In contrast to the Arab Spring, the Orange Revolution was entirely peaceful, as the Snow Revolution has been, and neither was triggered by economic or social crisis.

But there are also significant differences. Ukraine has a big ethnic divide between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers. The Ukrainian opposition was well entrenched in the parliament and media, rendering it part of the old system.

The outstanding achievement of the Orange Revolution was political and civil freedom. But its ultimate flaw was a nearly complete political stalemate, which led to even worse corruption and authoritarianism. The Orange Revolution was peaceful because a sufficiently large number of people took to the streets. The Russian opposition has already absorbed that insight, minimising the risk of violence.

But it might have been a mistake in 2004 to occupy the centre of Kiev and pursue persistent demonstrations that forced a quick resolution of the crisis, because it would have prompted a flawed compromise with the old regime. The sudden relief caused dangerous euphoria and hubris among the Orange revolutionaries.

For this reason, the Russian opposition is probably being sensible by holding large demonstrations from time to time, showing the regime its strength but not forcing an instant solution.

Indeed, the sudden resolution of the Orange Revolution led to the adoption of a dysfunctional constitution with a confusing and unwieldy division of powers. It looked like a trap set by the old regime’s operators.

There is no reason for anybody to repeat such a mistake. A constitution requires serious consideration. The old regime’s adherents can more easily trick the newcomers into dangerous compromises if the process is exceedingly fast.

The other major shortcoming was that the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, turned out to be a feckless and irresponsible president.

Initially, he travelled the world for months to celebrate his victory, ignoring the chaos back home. Then he began vetoing virtually all decisions by the government, causing a political stalemate, and, toward the end, tacitly joined with the old guard (now back in power).

By contrast, Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” of 2003 carried out a wholesale change of senior officials, bringing in young and well-educated leaders with Western educations. Russia needs a new generation of young, skilled, and untinted professionals.

Russia should, therefore, draw the four major lessons from the Orange Revolution as its own Snow Revolution proceeds.

First, the new democrats must avoid being tricked into a dysfunctional compromise with the old regime.

Second, leaders are critical to a sustainable democratic breakthrough, and this choice will be as vital as it is difficult.

Third, Russia needs a cleansing of corrupt officials, and it should draw from its wealth of young and well-trained talent. And finally, re-privatisation is a poison pill that must be avoided.

The Orange Revolution was no mistake, but a just cause is no guarantee of victory. Russia’s Snow revolutionaries must make sure that the good fight is also a smart fight.

• Anders Åslund, is a senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.