Analysis: Iraq must solve its own internal problems

THE narrative of contemporary Iraq is becoming etched in stone: United States troops are leaving, and the country is falling apart. Iraq, we are told, is once again on the brink of dictatorship, this time under the Shia politician Nuri al-Maliki, prime minister since 2006.

The notion that Iraq’s ongoing political problems were caused by America’s departure, or could be improved by its return, is something only a solipsistic American could believe. Iraq’s political problems are of Iraq’s making, and need to be resolved by Iraqis. Outside mediation can help. But foreign troops, engaged for eight years as a post-invasion occupying force, are not ideal for this task.

Spending time in Baghdad reveals that Sunni and Shia Iraqis have learned to live together, that intermarriage is common, and that the issues that concern people are more secular than sectarian. But trips to Sunni-dominated Anbar or Shia-controlled southern Iraq reveal a country much more animated by the Sunni-Shia divide. And this phenomenon did not begin with the US-led invasion. It had a thousand-year head start.How people group themselves in a society – by tribe, sectarian identity, ethnicity, region, the urban-rural distinction, or attitudes concerning the role of government – is the essence of politics. Political identities change as modernisation increases the salience of socio-economic factors and Iraq will not be immune to such shifts.

For now, the reality of Iraq is that most people, especially outside of Baghdad, see themselves as Sunni or Shia. And that reality is further shaped by the following fact: for decades, Iraq was brutally and not very effectively ruled by the minority Sunnis, whose last leader was Saddam Hussein. The Shia, understandably, don’t want them back.

In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Sunnis set aside their internal differences and united under a single political party called Iraqiyya (Iraqi National Movement). Of course, its organisers do not describe it as a Sunni party. Rather, it is described as a national party that welcomes people of all orientations. But, within Iraq, there are very few people – Sunni or Shia – who do not see Iraqiyya as a party dedicated to restoring Sunni leadership.

The results of the March 2010 general election gave Iraqiyya 91 parliamentary seats, two more than the second-place finisher, Mr Maliki’s State of Law coalition. But Iraqiyya was unable to forge a government coalition. Meanwhile, Mr Maliki, with 89 seats, was able to reach out to other Shia parties and the Kurds, assembling a “national unity” government to gain a second term as prime minister.

Iraq’s economy is stumbling in the right direction, as are its security conditions, notwithstanding the recent attacks on Shia pilgrims (mostly likely carried out by al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia and other Sunni extremists). But Iraq’s politics remain problematic.

Mr Maliki should do something that hasn’t been done in the Middle East for a long time: now and again, he should turn the other cheek and resist going after his adversaries.

The Sunnis need to get used to being members of a coalition, rather than its leaders. Shia majority rule is an immovable fact of life, at least for as long as Iraq’s citizens tie their political identities to sectarian affiliations. Iraqiyya’s leaders should demonstrate more competence in governance rather than inflaming tensions, as vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni hardliner, has done by pronouncing Mr Maliki another Saddam.

Other Arab states, where Sunnis dominate, can help by coming to terms with Shia majority rule in Iraq. They worked to reconcile differences within the Iraqi Sunni community. Perhaps they can facilitate Sunni-Shia reconciliation as well, and stop insinuating that Iraqi Shia are Iranian proxies. Embracing Iraq, rather than undermining it, would be a good way to start.

• Christopher R Hill was US ambassador to Iraq