Allan Massie: Admit defeat and bring our soldiers home

Ministers must accept reality and stop exposing troops to risk of mutilation and death in a hopeless Afghan war that can never be won, writes Allan Massie

Two British soldiers are killed in Lashkar Gar in Helmand province by a gunman from the Afghan National Army. Elsewhere, another Nato serviceman is killed apparently by an Afghan police officer. Already this year 15 members of the Nato forces have been killed by Afghan security troops or by Taleban soldiers wearing government uniforms. According to shadow defence secretary Jim Murphy: “Since 2007, Afghan forces have attacked Nato forces, resulting in 75 fatalities, most over the last two years.”

It is more than 11 years since we invaded Afghanistan after 9/11. The Taleban, Islamist zealots who had governed the country since the defeat and expulsion of the Russians, had given sanctuary and aid to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. So they must be destroyed – even though the Taleban government had, in its alarm, offered to hand bin Laden over to a neutral country. The war went well. With the help of some unsavoury warlords – the so-called Northern Alliance – the Taleban were defeated and scattered. Washington, backed up by London, promised to bring democracy to Afghanistan – the successful conclusion of the short campaign was hailed as a triumph for the doctrine of liberal interventionism as expounded by Tony Blair.

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The triumph was short-lived. Elections were indeed held. A pseudo-democratic government under President Karzai was installed. It was soon evident that the chief question about Karzai was whether he was more corrupt than ineffective, or vice-versa. Meanwhile, the Taleban regrouped and engaged in hostilities. Years of small-scale, but dangerous and demoralising, war followed. Victories were announced, but “pacification” did not bring peace. “We are in it for the long haul” declared successive British commanders and defence ministers, echoing the words spoken in Washington.

Our war, or engagement, in Afghanistan has now lasted twice as long as the Second World War. Its purpose, rarely clear since the early months, has now changed. We no longer hope to defeat and extirpate the Taleban. Instead we speak of leaving the Karzai government in office and control when we have trained the Afghan National Army and police to satisfactory standards, so that we can withdraw all combat troops , as already announced, sometime in 2014. Meanwhile, talks have been held with at least some elements of the Taleban to persuade them to turn from war to politics, and come in, as it were, from the cold. When they do so, as few doubt that they will, they will take over command once again. Even now, President Karzai’s power is more or less limited to Kabul and the district immediately around it. Even there, subversive activities are common.

Meanwhile, hatred of Nato troops intensifies. It is fuelled partly by outrage at recent incidents – American soldiers urinating on copies of the Koran, the murderous shooting spree on which a possibly deranged American sergeant embarked; partly by resentment of American night-raids which kill, or are believed to kill, more civilians than Taleban fighters. It is said that there are now fewer open-air wedding parties in Afghan villages, because so many have been bombed because of a misconception that they were gatherings of the Taleban. This may not be true, but the belief that it is fuels the hatred of foreigners.

It is time to ask whether we are indeed achieving anything that will be of lasting value in Afghanistan, time to consider whether our involvement there has been doomed to failure from the start. We send young men – and women – to Afghanistan for what we claim, may indeed believe, is a worthy, even noble , purpose: to bring peace, order and democracy to a wild and unruly land. Having abandoned the attempt to defeat and eradicate the Taleban, we are instead devoting most of our efforts to training the Afghan army, police and security forces, all of which are easily infiltrated by Taleban members or sympathisers, some of whom now turn and murder the soldiers who are training them.

We can’t pull out now – so the official line goes – because if we do so the Taleban will return to power and al-Qaeda , or what remains of it, will once again have a secure base. But both the US and the British governments have committed themselves to the withdrawal of all but training troops in 2014. And when this happens, Taleban influence will be greater and their infiltration of the Afghan forces will be all the easier. More of our soldiers assigned to the training of the Afghan forces will be killed – and to what purpose? Is it really worth exposing our soldiers to this danger, and in effect asking them to be ready to die, in order to prop up the corrupt, incompetent and unpopular Karzai regime, and perhaps delay the return of the Taleban to power for a few more months?.

It is time to admit that our Afghan venture, however well-intentioned, has failed, just as our previous Afghan wars in the 19th century failed, just as the Soviet intervention 30 years ago failed. All enjoyed some initial success. We got to Kabul – the Russians occupied Kabul – but eventually we departed, they departed – and Afghanistan went its own harsh and unruly way. That’s going to happen again. This is the reality, which our political leaders should no longer refuse to admit. The war has been a sad and costly failure which has also, among other things, severely damaged the West’s relations with Pakistan, and contributed to the rise of terrorist activity there. The War on Terror, launched by Bush and Blair, has turned terrible itself.

We should say “enough”. We should stop exposing our soldiers to danger, mutilation and death in a hopeless cause, and bring them home now. It is not dishonourable to admit defeat, but it is dishonourable to pretend that a war which cannot be won may still be won. It is dishonourable, and even wicked, to let our soldiers be killed, simply, as is now the case, to save the face of our political leaders, and for no other discernable reason.

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