Britain told Saddam's WMDs useless

Published on Wednesday 25 November 2009 20:47

THE government was told only days before the Iraq invasion that Saddam Hussein might be unable to use his chemical weapons, the official inquiry into the war has heard.

On the second day of public hearings in London, senior Foreign Office officials said intelligence had been received in March 2003 suggesting Saddam had "disassembled" his chemical weapons and not given the order to reassemble them.

They said ministers were repeatedly warned intelligence on Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was "patchy", even though then prime minister Tony Blair told parliament they represented a "clear and present" threat.

Sir William Ehrman, who was director of international security at the Foreign Office, said reports to ministers by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had made clear just how uncertain the intelligence was.

In April 2000, the picture was described as "limited to chemical weapons"; in May 2001, the knowledge of WMD and ballistic missile programmes was "patchy"; in March 2002, the intelligence was "sporadic and patchy".

In August 2002, a briefing noted "we know very little" about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons work since late 1998, and, in September 2002, the intelligence "remained limited".

With British and United States troops massed on the Iraq border and the invasion days away, Sir William said evidence had come in that Saddam's weapons might not be usable at all.

However, he insisted it had not made any difference to the case for war, as it simply proved Saddam was not co-operating with UN weapons inspectors.

Tim Dowse, who was head of counter-proliferation at the Foreign Office, said that when he took up the post in 2001, Iraq was not seen as the main country of concern as far as WMD were concerned. "It wasn't top of the list," he said. "I would say we put Libya and Iran ahead of Iraq."

He said Iraq's nuclear programme was believed to have been dismantled by UN inspectors in the 1990s, while the chemical and biological materials it was thought to possess were not regarded primarily as battlefield weapons.

He said that, despite concerns in the US, there was no evidence that Saddam was prepared to supply chemical or biological weapons to terrorists, even after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

"There had been nothing that looked like a relationship between the Iraqis and al-Qaeda," Mr Dowse said.

"In fact, after 9/11, we concluded that Iraq actually stepped further back. They did not want to be associated with al-Qaeda. They weren't natural allies."

Sir William agreed. He told the inquiry: "We never found evidence linking him (Saddam] closely to al-Qaeda and we didn't believe that he was in any way behind the 9/11 bombings.

"We never found any evidence that chemical or biological material had been passed by the Iraqi regime to terrorists."

Mr Dowse said he had originally attached little importance to intelligence claiming the Iraqis had weapons they could deploy within 45 minutes, which subsequently featured heavily the government's notorious Iraq dossier.

"Speaking personally, when I saw the 45-minutes report, I did not give it particular significance because it didn't seem out of line with what we generally assessed to be Iraq's intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical weapons," he said.

"It certainly took on a rather iconic status that I don't think that those of us who saw the initial report really gave – it wasn't surprising."

After the invasion, Mr Dowse said there had been "surprise and concern" in government that no WMDs had been found. He said he had been so confident WMDs would be discovered that his main concern was they should not "declare success too rapidly" in the hunt for weapons, only to be proved wrong.

Asked about Mr Blair's claim that "massive evidence of a huge system of clandestine laboratories" had been found, Mr Dowse said: "I didn't advise him to use those words."

The inquiry continues.