Time to rethink the old global gunslinger

Published on Wednesday 22 April 2009 21:58

IS NATO necessary for the future of global security? As the management cliche has it, I would like you to think outside the box about this.

The recent summit revealed the weakness of the alliance. Contrary to the spirit of the Nato treaty, some countries are doing a lot more in Afghanistan than others. The discrepancy is so great that it is almost misleading to call it a Nato mission. Countries cannot share the benefits of collective security without sharing its burdens too.

Troops are needed to support the upcoming Afghan elections, to train Afghan soldiers and to rebuild the country. But all of this depends on the security situation; the most urgent need is for troops to fight the Taleban. There are three inequalities here.

Firstly, too many countries want do too little. Before the summit, Britain had 4.6 per cent of its forces in Afghanistan. Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Estonia all had between 2.5 and 4 per cent, and the United States had just over 2 per cent there. But other leading European countries such as Germany, Italy and France are all deploying significantly lower proportions of their forces.

At the summit, only 17 out of the 28 Nato members offered anything at all. And even after the promised soldiers arrive, the proportion of the non-American soldiers there will not rise, or even stay the same. It will actually fall.

The second inequality is that many of the governments in the alliance have negotiated 'national caveats' which prevent them from doing certain types of work.

In total, there are 76 of these national caveats, enabling troops to opt out of Nato command and obey their own national governments. The net result is that many Nato troops will remain shielded from combat.

Only a minority of countries' soldiers, including ours, will actually provide the security on which the whole operation depends.

The third inequality is that some governments have said they will only deploy troops if other countries do too. This does nothing to help the spirit of Nato's commitment to collective security.

These three inequalities – uneven deployment, uneven operational commitment and conditional deployment – mean that on the ground, Afghanistan does not look like a Nato mission, more a deployment of an ad hoc alliance. This impression is bolstered when you consider that eight non-Nato countries are contributing troops too.

However impressive an alliance this is, it does not really look like Nato. This is a problem because it calls into question how genuine and useful the alliance will be in the future.

It is no good simply arguing that Nato countries should share the burden more equally. That will not be enough to persuade sceptical governments to offer more troops. The truth is that the differences in deployment levels reflect real differences of public and political opinion.

Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect that they should agree in the future either. This is because there is no agreement on what Nato is there for any more. Look at the variety of some of the recent suggestions.

Some, particularly ex-communist countries, argue that Nato should be about protection from Russia in light of her action in Georgia and her air and naval deployments. Others argue that such talk threatens the global balance of power and that Russia should join the club.

Different countries argue that Nato should address nuclear proliferation. Others think it should help against Islamist terrorism. Others prefer the promotion of democracy.

The range and variety of suggestions are a sign that the organisation has lost its way. The bottom line is that nobody knows what the central security challenges of the future will be.

Moreover, nobody knows whether Nato countries will see the same things as security challenges.

The fact is that since the end of the Cold War, Nato's role has evolved ad hoc according to the challenges it has taken on and the varying willingness of different members to do different things. Afghanistan is only the example which illustrates this most clearly.

In that context, what is the merit of assuming that in the future Nato should remain the centrepiece of Western defence strategy?

When thinking about what strategic alliances might be necessary to face the security threats of the future, it often looks like the mere existence of Nato constrains the imaginations of policymakers.

The question we should be asking ourselves is not "Given future security threats, what role should the Nato alliance play?" Rather, it should be "Given future security threats, what kind of alliance might we need?"

If we were designing an alliance most suitable to face the threats of the future, would it look like Nato?

I believe that the divisions over Afghanistan show that the answer is no, it would not. Nato is the box we need to think outside of.

• Azeem Ibrahim is a research scholar at the International Security Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; a council member of Deans International Council, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago; and a director/policy board member, UK National Defence Association.