Platform: Time for new Israeli strategy as blunt instrument of war fails again

Published on Friday 9 January 2009 20:57

RAJA KAMAL Associate Dean at Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago

THE establishment of the state of Israel was largely due to the dedication and resistance of young Jews who fought against a significant and hostile local Arab population to establish a Jewish homeland.

It was an ideological war of survival and independence. Many young Jews, arriving from Europe with fresh memories of the Holocaust, realised that a defeat in Palestine was not an option. They persevered, and Israel was born in 1948.

Half a century later, Israel has emerged as a potent nation with one of the best armies in the world. Existence as a Jewish state is now a given assumption assured by being a strong nuclear nation with a healthy economy that is governed by a western-style democracy. The ideological struggle for survival is no longer front and centre for the current young Israeli generation as it was during the early period of independence.

Yet today, a similar survival ideology with a religious foundation is shared by two of Israel's declared enemies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Both are political movements that are entrenched in Islamic interpretations as a guiding force. Their strength, they claim, is attributed to a much higher power. Is Israel's modern army capable of defeating the religiously ideological Hezbollah and Hamas? And if the military option is not working, what should happen next? During the Lebanon War of 2006, Israel failed to achieve its objective of defeating Hezbollah.

In reality, the opposite happened. Hezbollah emerged much stronger politically and more potent militarily. The success of Hezbollah in Lebanon was attributed to the fact that it was fighting an ideological and religious war, while the Israeli soldiers in Lebanon were acting as a professional army.

Hezbollah fighters were convinced they are fighting a holy war where martyrdom could be the ultimate reward. The young Israeli soldiers were performing mandatory armed service and obeying orders. Religious ideology – no matter how you feel about it – is powerful. History is filled with examples. Israel inadvertently assisted Hezbollah solidify its position. Now, two years after the Lebanon war, Israel has a new military campaign in Gaza. Determined to stop the Hamas rockets aimed at Israeli towns and villages, Israel unleashed a massive military force aiming to eliminate or weaken Hamas. The cornered Hamas fighters are – and are likely to continue – fighting in the same way Hezbollah did in Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

Gaza, with the highest unemployment rate in the Arab world, is now isolated economically and politically. This dire situation seems to empower the hopeless youth that have turned to Hamas for an ideological answers. As with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas's numbers will likely rise and the latest escalation is likely to solidify their political survival. The greatest casualty here is the ever-elusive peace process. It is now nowhere to be seen.

With mounting casualties in Gaza and emergency conditions in southern Israel, even if this campaign achieves its objectives in the short run, it is likely that it will fail. It is a band-aid placed on a deep wound. How do you measure the success of the Gaza invasion? Rockets will continue to fly into Israel, and they are likely to become more advanced and sophisticated. During the 34 days of war in Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to launch rockets each day, with a record number launched on the final day before the ceasefire.

The large casualties will be certain to generate a new cadre of holy warriors willing to die fighting and attacking Israelis.

One thing we know for certain is the defining military approach has not worked with Hezbollah and is not likely to work with Hamas. Perhaps a new strategy is now warranted: comprehensive negotiation.