James Mitchell: Lingering questions over Blair's Journey

Published on Tuesday 31 August 2010 13:39

At Labour's 1996 conference, Tony Blair joked about nicknames he'd been called: "First it was Stalin. Then it was Kim Il Sung. Now it's the devil with the demon eyes. Can't we just go back to Bambi?"

In his short period as Labour leader, his image had undergone a dramatic transformation. But the real transformation was yet to come. From the media-fixated, focus-group obsessed politician, Tony Blair became a conviction politician, convinced he was doing the right thing regardless of what others might think.

Mr Blair's rise to Labour's leadership was striking for the shallowness of his previous involvement in the party. His motivation and philosophy were unclear, perhaps as much to himself as to the public. He was a mirror, reflecting back views held by the public, rather than a leader of opinion.

He was an outsider compared with previous Labour leaders and that was part of his appeal beyond the party. Each political party has a sub-culture and language of its own. This is most evident at party conferences where the language and the rituals are foreign to the uninitiated. Mr Blair dispensed with this and made politics accessible in a way that previous party leaders, not just Labour leaders, had never dared for fear of a backlash amongst activists. Talking about his kids came more naturally to him than his comrades. Clause 4 was as incomprehensible to him as to ordinary voters.

This demystification of politics may prove one of his lasting legacies. Future party leaders, at least successful ones, will spend far less time tickling the activists' bellies.

But this demystification of politics came at a cost. Activists anchor a party to its principles and values. Break that link and a party drifts aimlessly on the tide of popular opinion or is directed by the whim of its leaders. Labour traditionalists put up with this because they wanted to win. Mr Blair's outsider status meant he could distance himself from Labour's recent unpopular past. He was a winner as Labour had never had. Not only did he win three successive election victories, he did so with massive majorities.

But political success cannot be measured solely in terms of electoral success. As prime minister, Mr Blair presided over a government that introduced significant change. But much was inherited policy. His contribution was often to sell it to the public and he did this well. This was particularly true of constitutional reforms which compared in scale with Attlee's nationalisation and welfare state.In 2005, Richard Wilson, secretary to the Cabinet from 1998-2002, maintained that "history may judge that one of the most important and lasting legacies of Mr Blair's government has been its impact on the British constitution and the institutions of the state". One account listed 15 major constitutional reforms from devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to a London mayor incorporating the introduction of different electoral systems, the Human Rights Act, removal of most hereditary peers, freedom of information legislation, establishment of the Electoral Commission and registration of political parties, to the establishment of a Supreme Court. Reformers were keen to open up government and check the arbitrary use of power, reacting against centralised authority under Margaret Thatcher.

Mr Blair refused to see the reforms as revolutionary. They represented "modernisation", the rhetorical device used to describe disparate changes invoked by each new generation of politicians. But it was remarkably incoherent. Despite all the talk of "joined-up government" there was little evidence of joined-up thinking. Each reform had its logic but taken together and with Mr Blair's evolving convictions created new tensions in the system of government. The implications of devolution were paid scant attention: the West Lothian Question and devolution's finances were left for a future government to tackle. Devolution and the Supreme Court were treated as unconnected until well into the process of government.

Two years into office, he complained about "wreckers" in the public sector and "scars" on his back. In 2002, he said the battle between "reformers and wreckers" was the "battle for this parliament". He was more at ease with the private than public sector and too comfortable with those with fabulous wealth. He showed little appreciation of the process of government and expected instant results. His experience of government, faith in market solutions to public policy problems and emergence of a deeply illiberal streak led him to concentrate power at the centre.

The liberalism of freedom of information and Human Rights legislation jarred with illiberal policies on detention and his support for of identity cards. The decentralisation of devolution clashed with his interference in choosing Labour leaders for Wales and London and efforts to give unprecedented power to ministers outside wartime. This incoherence was made more explicit in its incompleteness. Given Mr Blair's electoral mandate, radical reform of the Lords was possible but his hesitancy and confusion surrounding different stages of reform made mockery of claims to modernisation.

Mr Blair's style of government caused anxiety in Westminster and Whitehall. He was never much of a Commons man. After sidelining party members, his MPs were marginalised and Cabinet government was replaced by "sofa government", a highly informal approach to decision-making.The last can be partly understood in terms of relations with his Chancellor. Much has been made of the "dual-premiership" in which Gordon Brown was given considerable autonomy over economic and much social policy. Many initiatives, including the minimum wage, were driven by Brown.

Blair has escaped much of the blame for New Labour's economic hubris and fiscal wrecklessness. But these policies were partly a consequence of his reluctance to stand up to his Chancellor. He was all too willing to stand up to dictators but unable to stand up to the Chancellor in whom he had lost confidence. The relationship between a prime minister and Chancellor is central to the success of any government and the pathology of the Blair-Brown relationship meant there was nothing approaching joined-up government.

In opposition, he asserted the need to put Britain at the heart of Europe and gave the impression he would be the most pro-European integration premier since Ted Heath. In 2003, he described the draft European constitution as "good news for Britain" but in time adopted traditional British Euro-scepticism.

Mr Blair's foreign policy interventions will overshadow all else in assessments of his legacy. This was Blair the conviction politician. "Humanitarian intervention" became his justification and he argued his case across the globe with passion. This conviction contributed to the abandonment of "old Europe" and adoption of a new 'special relationship' with George Bush's administration. He had more in common with Gladstone, the 19th century Liberal premier, than any of the 20th century Labour leaders. But, again, decisions were taken by cliques, without adequate scrutiny, with disastrous consequences. The rhetoric of evidence-based policy-making sat uneasily alongside Mr Blair's conviction-driven approach.

At the start of his premiership, Mr Blair feared offending public opinion, suspicious of his party and turned to focus groups and spin doctors. He grew in confidence, especially in foreign affairs towards the end, though without commensurate growth in judgment. There remain many unanswered questions about the Blair premiership. Central to these is his transformation into a conviction politician. His autobiography may provide clues but is unlikely to provide answers. Like any conviction politician, his legacy will provoke dispute well into the future.

• James Mitchell is professor of politics at the School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.