Iraq Inquiry: Lord Goldsmith says US changed his view on invasion

Published on Wednesday 27 January 2010 21:57

BRITAIN'S legal justification for invading Iraq was based largely on opinions given to the government's top lawyer by George Bush's senior White House team, it has emerged.

• Picture: Getty

Lord Goldsmith, the former attorney general, told the Iraq Inquiry yesterday he changed his mind and backed military action only after being flown to the White House, where American officials attempted to persuade him his long-held legal objections to war were wrong.

Prior to that meeting, Lord Goldsmith had consistently told prime minister Tony Blair that Britain would require a second United Nations resolution, backing "all necessary means" of disarming Saddam Hussein, before he could commit British troops. He told the inquiry that advice was "not terribly welcome" in Downing Street.

And last night, the BBC reported a former Bush aide saying: "We had trouble with your attorney general, but we got him there eventually."

Earlier this week, Foreign Office lawyers told the inquiry they, too, had warned that the use of force required "explicit authorisation" from the UN.

But Lord Goldsmith revealed he had performed a U-turn within 48 hours of being lobbied by the US. He concluded that the first UN resolution, 1441, warning Iraq of "serious consequences" was enough for action.

Lord Goldsmith had been sent to Washington on 10 February, 2003, as the Blair government realised a second UN resolution specifically authorising war was increasingly unlikely.

According to letters released by the inquiry, Jack Straw, the then foreign secretary, had that week told the attorney general he wanted a legal interpretation on military action that "coincided with our firm policy intention".

Lord Goldsmith believed at that point he could not authorise war on legal grounds. But then US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and her officials told him they had not conceded a veto to the French on military action when previously negotiating resolution 1441. Lord Goldsmith said they made it clear this was Mr Bush's one "red line" in negotiations prior to 1441's adoption.

He said this changed everything, saying he found it "hard to believe" the US would have agreed to 1441 if such a veto were in place.

Two days later, in talks with his legal assistant in London, he said he had come to the conclusion that if the French had not vetoed military action under 1441, then a second resolution was not necessary and that this gave him the "specific authorisation" required. "We discussed this and I must have told her at this stage because it was my view 'I now do consider that there is a reasonable case'," he said.

Lord Goldsmith admitted he had not checked the US story with the French government. He said: "You cannot have the British attorney general being seen to go to the French and ask them, 'What do you think?'

"The message that would have given to Saddam Hussein about the degree of your commitment would have been huge."

His evidence is certain to be put to Mr Blair, when he appears at the inquiry tomorrow. The former PM is sure to be quizzed on whether he pressured his senior legal adviser to reach the required view.

Lord Goldsmith insisted yesterday he had not been pressured into action, describing claims he had been "pressed against a wall" in the effort to make him change his mind as "absolute, complete and utter nonsense".

However, his inquiry evidence showed how he had changed his mind completely over the six months prior to the Iraq invasion.

He first warned No 10 as early as July 2002 that Britain needed specific UN support to take part in military action. He attended a meeting at Downing Street on 24 July that year, at which he said self-defence and humanitarian intervention would provide "no basis" for the use of force against Iraq. He then sent a follow-up letter reiterating his point to Mr Blair. He said: "I did it of my own volition because I knew that the prime minister was going to see President Bush in the United States.

"I didn't want there to be any doubt that, in my view, the prime minister could not have the view that he could agree with President Bush somehow 'let's go without going back to the United Nations'."

Pressed about the letter, he said: "I wasn't asked for it. I don't frankly think it was terribly welcome."

Between July and October, Lord Goldsmith said he was frozen out of talks on Iraq, insisting he was "not included in meetings at all".

He met Mr Straw on 7 November to warn him not to assume UN resolution 1441, then about to be passed, would make it "all right on the night" should legal justification for military action be needed.

Lord Goldsmith's objections continued into 2003, right up until his trip to the US. He said he told No 10 of his decision to give the "green light" on 27 February. However, it was not until mid-March that he told parliament.

In the intervening period, he said his new view, that there was a "reasonable" case for war, was hardened up even further, after military chiefs demanded a more concrete legal verdict. He said: "They deserved more. Our troops deserved more… than my saying there was a reasonable case. So, therefore, it was important for me to come down clearly on one side of the argument or another, which is what I proceeded to do."

On 17 March, Lord Goldsmith told parliament that 1441 "reactivated" UN resolution 678 – agreed at the end of the Gulf war – which authorised the international community to use "all necessary means to restore international peace and security" in the region after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The following day, Mr Blair won a Commons vote on going to war.

Reflecting on the legality of the war, Lord Goldsmith said it was not black or white. He said: "The question 'Is it lawful or not?' only admits, ultimately, the answer yes or no. It could not be a little bit lawful. And, having reached the conclusion the better view was that it was lawful, that was my view."

What happened

24 July, 2002 – Lord Goldsmith attends a meeting at No10 at which he warns that self-defence and humanitarian intervention would provide "no basis" for the use of force against Iraq.

He follows this up with a letter saying Tony Blair cannot agree to go to war with US president George Bush without further UN support.

7 November – Lord Goldsmith warns then-foreign secretary Jack Straw he should not expect it will be "all right on the night" even after a new UN resolution.

11 November – Lord Goldsmith tells No 10 he is "pessimistic" about the possibility of military action without a second UN resolution.

14 January, 2003 – Lord Goldsmith gives Mr Blair a five-page draft legal opinion which says a further resolution specifically authorising the use of force is necessary.

23 January – Goldsmith meets Britain's ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, in London to get a first-hand account of what was said during negotiations for resolution 1441. The ambassador tells him other permanent Security Council members accept another resolution was not essential.

But the attorney general remains unconvinced and writes to Mr Blair after the meeting to make it clear his opinion has not changed.

10 February – Lord Goldsmith meets senior US officials and lawyers – including national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and senior State Department legal adviser Will Taft – in Washington.

12 February – Goldsmith finally concludes that a second resolution is not necessary and he should revise his earlier draft opinion.

27 February – Lord Goldsmith tells No 10 he has changed his mind and gives Mr Blair the "green light" to take military action.

7 March – Lord Goldsmith formally presents Mr Blair with a 13-page legal opinion in which he says a "reasonable case" could be made for launching an attack without further Security Council support. But he says ministers and troops may face legal action on the war.

Lord Goldsmith states without reservation that resolution 1441 provides the necessary authority for the conflict.

20 March – War begins.

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