Soldier killed by comrade's shot 'a victim of unit's poor preparation'

INADEQUATE training of British troops could have caused the suspected "friendly fire" death of a British soldier in Afghanistan, according to a report by the Royal Navy Board of Inquiry published yesterday.

Lance-Corporal Mathew Ford, from 45 Commando Royal Marines, died after he was shot in Afghanistan in January 2007 as troops stormed a Taleban fort.

The inquiry warned that troops had not been properly prepared or equipped.

And it concluded that L-Cpl Ford, who lived in Dundee with his fiancee and was with Z Company in Arbroath, was almost certainly shot by another British soldier.

Troops were "forced to adapt to a fast-moving environment quite different to that for which they had trained", the report said.

Instead of patrolling the streets of Kabul, the Zulu Company was engaged in fighting to take Jugroom Fort from 60 Taleban fighters.

It is believed L-Cpl Ford died after an inexperienced machine gunner sprayed a round of bullets at a fort wall, believing he was firing at the enemy, wounding four comrades and fatally wounding L-Cpl Ford.

The troops had received no live firing training at company level.

Although it was likely L-Cpl Ford had died instantly, the unit then withdrew without realising he was missing. The unit later recovered his body.

The attack on the fort was a dangerous and complex operation carried out with "minimal preparation", the report said.

Despite requests, there was no "mission-specific equipment" for training in Britain.

The soldier suspected of the shooting had been given a "hurried briefing" and had reacted spontaneously to what he believed was enemy fire.

While there was "no suggestion of negligence", there had been a "momentary error of judgment".

The report said 3 Commando Brigade was originally to be deployed in Iraq, but a change in destination in April 2006 to Afghanistan had done "little to aid training preparation".

Z Company was given extra training in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, including the use of live ammunition. But the report said while training was sufficient for most aspects of the operation, it was not sufficient for the taking of the fort itself.

Initial training had focused on multiple "patrolling", it said.

"It is clear there was a requirement to learn lessons 'on the job', sometimes the hard way."

Major-General Jerry Thomas, commanding officer of 3 Commando Brigade at the time of the assault, said he would not have sent the troops if he did not believe they had been able to conduct the operation successfully.

"The decision was made after a careful judgment, accepting that, while risk can be minimised, it can never be removed entirely," he said.

Bob Ainsworth, the armed forces minister, denied the troops were "under-prepared or under-resourced" for taking the fort, but later said: "There clearly were issues with the preparation of the operation, and the Royal Marines themselves will be looking at that soon."

Left behind in confusion of gun battle at Taleban fort

THE decision to attack Jugroom Fort was taken after troops who approached the area were repeatedly attacked and it was identified as a stronghold for enemy forces.

Although they were prepared, many soldiers considered success in the task "unlikely" and yesterday's report said: "It was not planned, briefed in detail or rehearsed."

In the early hours of 15 January, 2007, troops fired on the fort.

There was little return fire and it was decided that Zulu Company would enter the fort in darkness at 6am through a bomb hole in the wall, supported by Viking armoured vehicles.

The report said this "slipped" to 6:30am, by when it was getting light.

A grenade was pushed through the gap in the wall and troops dived through.

But a gunner on one of the Vikings saw a flash in the gap, "swung his weapon round almost 180 degrees and opened fire. Other soldiers quickly shouted at him to stop firing.

The report said the gunner was in the turret of the vehicle, which was driven by his "much more experienced commander". He also shouted to the gunner to halt his fire.

Four casualties were quickly evacuated but a head count revealed that Lance-Corporal Mathew Ford was missing. A search failed to find him.

A message came back that someone called Ford was with the casualties and troops withdrew.

It was only later that they realised the person with the casualties was a different soldier with the same surname.